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iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

PlaintiffZAppellee

:

v.

:

REBECCA CHAMPNEYS

:

Defendant/Appellant

:

Case No. 20020123-CA
Priority No. 2

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted tampering with
evidence, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated sections 76-8-510
and 76-4-101 (1999), and attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated sections 76-6-501 and 76-4-101 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction
over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 2001), which
grants this Court jurisdiction over cases not involving a first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
1. Did the police have probable cause of a crime based on an informant's tip
without conducting any meaningful, independent investigation to corroborate the reported
criminal activity? In reviewing whether the police had cause probable cause of criminal

activity, this Court overturns factual findings for clear error and reviews the trial court's
legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332, ^[8, 37 P.3d
260. Trial counsel specifically argued below that the police lacked probable cause. R.
34-37; 116: 19-23.1
2. Did exigent circumstances justify the police in conducting a warrantless search
of a motel room based on two women's tidying up and scurrying after the police knocked
on their motel room door? In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court
reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness. Valenzuela.
2001 UT App 332, ^[8, 37 P.3d 260. Trial counsel contested the exigency of the situation
in a motion to suppress and at a subsequent hearing. R. 34-37; 116: 19-23.2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from
unreasonable searches and seizures:
!

The volume marked 116 contains the transcript of the hearing on the motion to
suppress. Volume 117 contains the plea hearing transcript. The internal page numbers of
those volumes are included after" R.:" and the volume number.
2

These same issues arise in a co-defendant's case which is pending before this
Court in State v. Corwell, No. 20020343-CA. Because both appeals raise identical issues,
and no conflict of interest exists between these cases, appellate counsel represents both
Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell on appeal. Appellate counsel has not sought to
consolidate these appeals, however, because a motion to withdraw Ms. Cornell's guilty
plea remains pending in the trial court. Appellate counsel has requested this Court to stay
Ms. Corwell's appeal pending the outcome of her motion.
2

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Article I, section XIV of the Utah Constitution provides similar protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 4, 2001, the State filed an Information charging Appellant Rebecca
Champneys with one count each of tampering with evidence, unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 2. Ms.
Champneys filed a motion to suppress the evidence that the police obtained from her
during a warrantless search of her motel room. R. 34. The State opposed the motion. R.
26. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R. 91; 116: 24-26. The
trial court also consolidated this case with a forgery charge that the State had filed against
Ms. Champneys in case number 011918743. R. 116: 27; 117: 13.
On December 7, 2001, Ms. Champneys agreed to plead guilty to one count each of
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attempt to tamper with evidence and attempted forgery. R. 81. In exchange for the pleas,
the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to allow Ms. Champneys to
challenge the denial of her motion to suppress on appeal. R. 81; 117: 2-4. The trial court
accepted the guilty pleas the same day. R. 117: 13-14.
On February 1, 2002, the trial court sentenced Ms. Champneys to a term of up to
five years imprisonment but suspended that term and placed her on probation for 24
months. R. 95-96; Addendum. The judge also ordered the sentence to run concurrently
with the sentence for the attempted forgery charge. R. 95. In addition, the trial judge
imposed a fine but suspended part of it, ordered Ms. Chamnpeys to pay $350 toward the
cost of her court-appointed attorney, enrolled her in a drug treatment program, and
ordered her to perform 75 hours of community service. R. 96-97. Ms. Champneys filed a
timely notice of appeal on February 13, 2002. R. 98.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 13, 2000, a caller telephoned Salt Lake City police dispatch and stated
that a woman named Liza Crowell was with another woman in room 236 at a motel
located at 1990 West and North Temple Street. R. 40, 47; 116: 3. The caller claimed that
the two women were either using or selling drugs in the room. R. 47-48. The police
dispatched several officers to the motel including Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy
Ita. R. 40; 116:3.
4

The record indicates that the police did not know the identity of the caller when
they went to the motel. Although the caller appears to have been Liza's husband, the
record does not indicate when the police learned this information. Detective Anderson
testified at the preliminary hearing that dispatch had informed him that Liza's husband
had made the call. R. 48. But, at the suppression hearing, three months later, he insisted
three times that he could not remember the dispatch report including the caller's identity
when he responded to the motel. R. 116:3,9, 13. Based on the lack of evidence, the trial
court found that the filler was "anonymous." R. 116: 24.
Detectives Anderson and Ita went to the motel room to perform strictly a "knock
and talk." R. 40. A knock and talk involves the police approaching a residence without a
warrant to see if the occupants are willing to cooperate with the police. R. 49. Both
detectives were in plain clothes. R. 116: 11.
Detective Ita knocked on the door of room 236 and Ms. Champneys inquired, from
behind the door, who was knocking. R. 40. Detective Ita responded, "Tracy." R. 40.
Ms. Champneys asked again who had knocked on the door. R. 40. Detective Ita
identified himself as "Tracy" and added that he was a police detective. R. 40. Ms.
Champneys demanded to see a police badge which Detective Ita presented through the
peep hole and Detective Anderson presented through the window leading into the room.
R. 41; 116: 4. Detective Anderson testified that there was a gap between the window
curtains where he could show his badge and see into the room. R. 50.
5

As Detective Anderson looked through the window, he informed Ms. Champneys
that the police were looking for a woman named Liza. R. 41. Ms. Champneys stated
through the closed door that she was alone in the room. R. 41. At that point, Detective
Anderson looked through the window and saw another woman in the room putting a
"metallic" object into a purse. R. 41, 49; 116: 6, 12. Det. Anderson stated that he
"thought" the object was the "right shape and size of a crack pipe." R. 41, 49; 116: 6, 12.
Ms. Champneys then acknowledged that the other woman in the room was Liza Corwell.
R. 116:5.
When Detective Anderson informed Detective James Tracy what he had observed,
Detective Tracy went to the motel manager's office for a key to the room. R. 42. While
Detective Tracy retrieved the key, Detective Anderson continued to talk to Ms.
Champneys and asked her to open the door. R. 42. Ms. Champneys refused, however, to
allow the police to enter. R. 42. Detective Anderson then observed the two women
hiding things under and behind the bed, including the purse that contained the metal
object. R. 42. The women also went in and out of the bathroom two to four times each.
R. 42: 116: 4, 7. In Detective Anderson's experience, criminal suspects are known to
flush drugs down a toilet or sink, especially, in motel rooms, to avoid detection. R. 116:
7.
Detective Tracy returned with the room key and opened the door. R. 42. The door
only opened a few inches because it was secured from the inside by a security latch. R.
6

42; 116: 8. The police again demanded that Ms. Champneys unlocked the door but she
refused. R. 42. When Det. Tracy kicked at the door, Ms. Champneys offered to open the
door halfway. R. 42. Without responding to this offer, Detective James Tracy kicked the
door completely open and the detectives entered the room. R. 42.
Detective Anderson immediately placed Ms. Champneys in a twist lock and
secured plastic flex cuffs on her wrists while the other detectives restrained Ms. Corwell.
R. 43. He searched Ms. Champneys' pockets and found a crack pipe. R. 43. Ms.
Champneys admitted that she used the pipe for smoking cocaine. R. 43. She then
become hostile and demanded that a female detective continue the search. R. 43.
Detective Anderson learned that a female detective was en route and waited for her
arrival. R. 43.
Officer Patty Roberts arrived shortly thereafter and searched both women,
separately in the bathroom. R. 44. Officer Roberts found a twist of cocaine in Ms.
Champneys bra and also found other items associated with drug usage. R. 44. As she
located this evidence, Officer Roberts placed it on the bathroom counter. R. 45. A
struggle then ensued between Officer Roberts and Ms. Champneys during which Ms.
Champneys claimed that the cocaine twist had fallen down the sink drain. R. 45-46.
Nevertheless, Officer Roberts found the cocaine in Ms. Champneys' hand. R. 46.
During the search of Ms. Corwell, Officer Roberts found a baggie of cocaine in her
bra as well. R. 52-53. The police also searched the purse in which Ms. Corwell had
7

stuffed the metal object and found a spoon with cocaine residue on it but no pipe. R. 116:
12. Detective Anderson admitted that during his observations through the window he
never saw the women possessing any drugs, he smelled nothing, and he heard no water
running, including the flushing of toilets. R. 116: 7, 12.
The State charged Ms. Champneys with one count each of tampering with
evidence, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia. R. 2. Ms. Champneys filed a motion to suppress the evidence the police
obtained from the warrantless search of her motel room. R. 34. The State opposed the
motion. R. 26. The trial court denied the motion and consolidated this case with a
forgery charge that the State had filed against Ms. Champneys in case number
011918743. R. 91; 116:24-26.
On December 7, 2001, Ms. Champneys agreed to plead guilty to one count each of
attempt to tamper with evidence and attempted forgery. R. 81. In exchange for the pleas,
the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to allow Ms. Champneys to
challenge the denial of her motion to suppress on appeal. R. 81; 117: 2-4. The trial court
accepted the guilty pleas the same day. R. 117: 13-14.
On February 1, 2002, the trial court sentenced Ms. Champneys to a term of up to
five years imprisonment but suspended that term and placed her on probation for 24
months. R. 95-96. The judge also ordered the sentence to run concurrently with the
sentence for the attempted forgery charge. R. 95. In addition, the trial judge imposed a
8

fine but suspended part of it, ordered Ms. Champneys to pay $350 toward the cost of her
court-appointed attorney, enrolled her in a drug treatment program, and ordered her to
perform 75 hours of community service. R. 96-97. This appeal followed. R. 98.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The police violated Ms. Champneys' right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures when they forcibly entered her motel room and arrested her without a
warrant. The police may search a residence without a warrant if they have probable
cause and if exigent circumstances require immediate police action. But, here, the police
lacked probable cause to search the room based on an anonymous tip and without
conducting more than minimal observations.
Similarly, the police lacked exigent circumstances to enter the motel room. The
State failed to meet its weighty burden of proving that the women in the room were
destroying evidence. The police saw no drugs, smelled no odors, or heard any sounds
that indicated that the women were flushing drugs down the toilet or sink. The absence of
evidence justifying a warrantless search rendered the search and arrest illegal.

9

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE POLICE LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY
CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL, WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND ARREST
The warrantless search and arrest of Ms. Champneys' violated her state and federal
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. f,[S]earches
conducted without a warrant 'aieper se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions/" State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz v. United
States. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis in original)). The exception at issue here
required the State to establish "probable cause and exigent circumstances." City of Orem
v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In finding exceptions to the warrant requirement, "[t]he State bears [a] particularly
heavy burden" of persuasion. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
"[Exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be a 'showing by those
who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made [the search]
imperative.'" Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 (quoting Collidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443,
455 (1971) (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted)). Because the police failed to
sufficiently corroborate the anonymous report of drug activity, they lacked both probable
cause and exigent circumstances necessary to conduct a warrantless search.

10

A.

Without Substantial Corroborating Evidence,
The Anonymous Tip Failed to Establish
Probable Cause

The ambiguous police observations coupled with the failure of the police to
corroborate the tip failed to support probable cause of a crime. When "the State
predicates its probable cause argument upon information received from an informant,
'[this Court] must examine the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the
informant's tip, together with police observations, provided probable cause to arrest'" the
defendant. State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,1(11, 37 P.3d 260 (quoting State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996), quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983)). "This inquiry involves ca practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances .. ., including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that... evidence of a crime will
be found.1" Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238)).
This Court considers three factors in determining whether probable cause supports
an arrest based on an informant's tip:
Our first focus is upon "the type of tip or informant involved,"
[Kavsville City v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App.
1997)], granting identified informants substantially more
credibility than anonymous informants. See id Next, we
examine "whether the informant gave enough detail about the
observed criminal activity to support a [seizure]," and concluded
that "[a] tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant
11

observed the details personally, instead of relaying information
from a third party." IdL at 236. Finally, we examine "whether
the police officer's personal observations confirm the
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip," noting that an officer
can corroborate the information" 'either by observing the illegal
activity[,] or byfindingthe person, [and the other material facts]
substantially as described by the informant.' " Id (citation
omitted). Moreover, while we stated that " '[w]here the
reliability of the information is increased, less corroboration is
necessary,'" idL (alteration in original) (citation omitted), we
also established that absent a risk to public safety we expect
police officers to make significant independent corroborative
efforts to confirm the information. See id.
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,1fl5, 37 P.3d 260.
Considering these factors, the police lacked probable cause of criminal activity.
First, "'[b]ecause an anonymous caller's basis of knowledge and veracity are typically
unknown,' anonymous tips are toward 'the low-end of the reliability scale.'" Mulcahv,
943 P.2d at 235 (quoting State v. Evans. 692 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
At the time the police knocked on Ms. Champneys' motel door, they only knew that an
anonymous caller claimed that two women were using or selling drugs in the room. See
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (reasonable suspicion based on police officer's
knowledge at the time of a search). Absent some '"indicia of reliability,'" an anonymous
tip fails to provide the police probable cause to search or arrest a person. JJL, 529 U.S. at
270 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)).
Second, the anonymous caller did not provide much detail or state that he had
"observed the details personally." Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 236. In fact, the caller indicated
12

that he lacked personal knowledge of the activities in the motel room. Specifically, he
claimed that Liza Corwell was with another woman in a motel room and they could be
either using or selling drugs. The caller's failure to specify what was occurring in the
room suggests that he had not personally witnessed any drug usage in the room. Thus, it
appears that the caller lacked first-hand knowledge with the situation. Id.
Third, the police made little "significant independent corroborative efforts to
confirm the information." Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,1fl5, 37 P.3d 260. The police
admitted that they never attempted to stake out the motel room to determine whether
anyone was frequenting the room. R. 116: 9. Likewise, the police failed to even contact
the motel manager before knocking on the door to confirm whether Ms. Corwell had
rented a room or whether any suspicious activity had occurred there. R. 116: 9-10. In
fact, the police made no effort to corroborate the tip, at all, before knocking on the door.
R. 116: 9-10. Rather than verifying the anonymous tip, it appears the police hoped either
to gain the occupants' consent to enter the room or to just test their luck and knock on the
door. The fact that the police performed a knock and talk shows that they believed
themselves that they lacked probable cause to obtain a search warrant.
Admittedly, the police did confirm that Ms. Corwell was in the room. But, in
determining the reliability of a tip, the information must "be reliable in its assertion of
illegal[] [activity], not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." J.L., 529
U.S. at 272; see also State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Without
13

confirming the existence of drug activity, the police lacked probable cause.
The only indication even hinting at drug usage was Det. Anderson's claim that he
saw Ms. Crowell place a "metallic" object into her purse which he "thought" was the
"right shape and size of a crack pipe." R. 49; 116: 6, 12. Det. Anderson's observations
merely amounted to a suspicion of drug activity. Of most importance, Det. Anderson was
mistaken in his belief that the metal object was a pipe. Moreover, despite his attempts to
make his description as definite as he could, he was only able to state that he "thought"
the object was a crack pipe. R. 49, 116: 6, 12. This vague assertion coupled with Det.
Anderson's inaccurate observations do not constitute "a fair probability that. . . evidence
of a crime w[ould] be found.1" Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Gates. 462 U.S. at
238)).
Likewise, the women's movements after the police announced their presence were
nothing more than suspicious activity rather than probable cause. Although the women
were obviously scurrying and tidying up the room, the police saw the women engaging in
no illegal activity. The police specifically stated that they saw no evidence that the
women possessed or hid drugs. The police saw nothing in the women's hands, detected
no smells, and heard no noises indicating that the women were disposing of drugs.
The police officers' failure to investigate the anonymous tip and their ambiguous
observations of the women hardly constituted "significant independent corroborative
efforts to confirm the information." Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 336,1fl5, 37 P.3d 260. In
14

sum, the police may have had a suspicion of criminal activity but they lacked probable
cause.

B,

The Suspects' Ambiguous Actions Failed to
Support that They Were Destroying Drugs

For similar reasons, the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of establishing
exigent circumstances to support the warrantless search. Beavers. 859 P.2d at 13.
"Exigent circumstances are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to believe that
entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence
improperlyfrustratinglegitimate law enforcement efforts.'" Id at 18 (quoting United
States v. McConnev. 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Or.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)).
On appeal, this Court must "review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
particular case to determine if thefindingof exigency was proper." Ashe, 745 P.2d at
1258.
Here, the State failed to present sufficient facts supporting an immediate need to
search the motel room to prevent the destruction of evidence. Det. Anderson conceded
that although the metal object appeared to be a crack pipe, he saw no other evidence of
drugs in the room. As noted above, the police saw the women holding nothing suspicious
in their hands, there was no evidence that drugs were being used in the room, and the
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police heard no noises that would suggest the destruction of evidence such as the flushing
of toilets or running water. Rather, the police only had a generalized concern that drug
offenders are known to destroy evidence to prevent detection. To conduct a warrantless
search, the police must have "particularized suspicion" as opposed to concerns for or
knowledge of criminal behavior generally. Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119, 124
(2000).
The State failed to meet its weighty burden of showing that the women were
destroying evidence. The women's tidying up and trips into the bathroom do not
necessarily suggest that they were destroying evidence. These actions could have been
wholly innocent such as cleaning the room or putting away personal or intimate items.
Absent more definite indications that evidence was being destroyed, the police
violated Ms. Champneys' rights when they forcibly entered her motel room. A person's
privacy interests in a motel room is on par with one's home. Lanza v. New York 370
U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962). Accordingly, "'[t]he need for an immediate search must be
apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual
rights provided by the warrant requirement.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (quoting United
States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1979)). Given the sacred nature of the
right to privacy in a dwelling and the ambiguity of the women's actions, the State failed
to establish that a reasonable person "cwould'" have concluded that the women were, in
fact, destroying evidence. l± (quoting McConnev. 728 F.2d at 1199).
16

CONCLUSION
Because the police lacked i

bable cause and exigent circumstances, Ms.

Champneys requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of her motion to
suppress.
Submitted, this 7*. day of June, 2002.

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Office as indicated above this

day of June, 2002.
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ADDENDUM

If

ED

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 011905093 FS

REBECCA CHAMPNEYS,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
February 1, 2002

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
PRESENT
OF JUDGMENT;
Clerk:
evelynt
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, LANA
0*7
Ob/*
DATE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): FINLAYSON, DAVID V

I£

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 17, 1958
Video
Tape Number:
2/1/02
Tape Count: 11:02/11:11
CHARGES
1. TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/07/2001 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This sentence runs concurrent with sentence in case

#011918743

Criminal Sentence @J

JD

Case No: 011905093
Date:
Feb 01, 2002
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$5000.00
$4250.00
$637.50
$1387.50
$5000.00
$4250.00
$637.50
$1387.50
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SLC, LDA
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Pay recoupment within the probation period.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1387.50 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.

Case No: 011905093
Date:
Feb 01, 2002
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Perform community service hours.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Complete 75 hours community service in lieu/of jail.
Complete an Out-Patient Substance Abuse
atment Program, at the
direction of APP.
Have no contact with the co-defendant.
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment
Dated this

/

day of

xrT^jt—"

^IMOTHY R. HANSON
^District Court Judge

